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ABSTRACT
This paper advances the theory of annuity demand. First, we derive sufficient conditions under
which complete annuitization is optimal, showing that this well-known result holds true in a more
general setting than in Yaari (1965). Specifically, when markets are complete, sufficient conditions
need not impose exponential discounting, intertemporal separability or the expected utility axioms;
nor need annuities be actuarially fair, nor longevity risk be the only source of consumption
uncertainty. All that is required is that consumers have no bequest motive and that annuities pay a
rate of return for survivors greater than those of otherwise matching conventional assets, net of
administrative costs. Second, we show that full annuitization may not be optimal when markets are
incomplete. Some annuitization is optimal as long as conventional asset markets are complete. The
incompleteness of markets can lead to zero annuitization but the conditions on both annuity and
bond markets are stringent. Third, we extend the simulation literature that calculates the utility gains
from annuitization by considering consumers whose utility depends both on present consumption
and a "standard-of-living" to which they have become accustomed. The value of annuitization hinges
critically on the size of the initial standard-of-living relative to wealth.
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Providing a secure source of retirement income is an issue of increasing importance to indi-
viduals and policy-makers alike. The most common retirement age for a male in the United
States today is 62 years 1 and, thanks to the substantial reduction in mortality risk at older
ages witnessed over the past century, expected remaining life span for a 62 year old male is
nearly 19 years { almost to age 81.2 There is, however, substantial uncertainty around this
expected value. Approximately 16 percent of 62 year old males will die before age 70, while
another 16 percent will live to age 90 or beyond. As a result, longevity risk - uncertainty
about how long one will live - is a substantial source of nancial uncertainty facing today's
retirees. Consideration of couples extends the upper tail of life expectancy outcomes.
Since the seminal contribution of Yaari (1965) on the theory of a life-cycle consumer
with an unknown date of death, annuities have played a central role in economic theory. His
widely cited result is that certain consumers should annuitize all of their savings. However,
these consumers were assumed to satisfy several very restrictive assumptions: they were von
Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility maximizers with intertemporally separable utility,
they faced no uncertainty other than time of death and they had no bequest motive. In
addition, the annuities available for purchase by these individuals were assumed to be actu-
arially fair. While the subsequent literature on annuities has occasionally relaxed one or two
of these assumptions, the \industry standard" is to maintain most of these conditions. In
particular, the literature has universally retained expected utility and additive separability,
the latter dubbed \not a very happy assumption" by Yaari.
This paper advances the theory of annuity demand in several directions. Section 2 derives
sucient conditions for complete annuitization to be optimal, demonstrating that this well-
known result holds true in a much more general setting than that in Yaari (1965). Specically,
we show that when markets are complete, it is not necessary for consumers to be exponential
discounters, for utility to obey expected utility axioms or be intertemporally separable, or for
annuities to be actuarially fair. Rather, all that is required for complete annuitization to be
optimal is that consumers have no bequest motive and that annuities pay a rate of return to
survivors, net of administrative costs, that is greater than the return on conventional assets
of matching nancial risk. Section 2.1 considers a two period setting with no uncertainty
other than date of death, in which all trade occurs at once. Here, all savings are annuitized so
long as there is no bequest and annuities have a higher return for survivors than conventional
1Gustman and Steinmeier (2002)
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1assets. Section 2.2 extends this result to the Arrow-Debreu case with arbitrarily many future
periods with aggregate uncertainty, as long as conventional asset and annuity markets are
complete.
Despite this strong theoretical prediction, few people voluntarily annuitize outside of
Social Security and dened benet plans. To provide theoretical guidance on why this so
called \annuity puzzle" might exist, in section 3 we show how the full annuitization result
can break down when markets for either annuities or conventional assets are incomplete.
Section 3.1 examines the case where conventional markets are complete but annuity markets
are incomplete. We derive the weaker result that as long as trade occurs all at once and
preferences are such that consumers avoid zero consumption in every state of nature, then
consumers will always annuitize at least part of their wealth. Also, if trade occurs all at
once, we derive the result that an annuitized version of any conventional asset will always
dominate the underlying asset for consumers with no bequest motive, even if the asset does
not pay o in every state of nature. An important consequence of this result is that the
nding that \annuities dominate conventional assets" extends past riskless bonds to risky
securities such as stocks or mutual funds.
A practical implication of these results is that \variable life annuities" may dominate
mutual funds, provided that the higher expenses associated with variable annuities are not
too high.3 For example, suppose the provider of a mutual fund family doubles the number of
available funds by oering a matching annuitized fund that periodically takes the accounts
of investors who die and distributes the proceeds across the accounts of surviving investors.4
The returns to this annuitized fund will strictly exceed the returns of the underlying fund
for surviving investors.
Section 3.2 considers situations in which it can be optimal not to annuitize any wealth at
all. A key nding of this section is that under plausible conditions on returns,5 incompleteness
of conventional asset markets as well as incompleteness of annuity markets themselves, is
required for zero annuitization to be optimal. This highlights the common observation that
part of the solution to the annuity puzzle may lie in the lack of complete insurance against
other types of risk. Section 3.2.3 sharpens this observation by showing an example where a
critical role is played by a decrease in the possible maximal date of death.
3We refer to true life annuities, not the variable annuities widely marketed that contain only an annuiti-
zation option.
4TIAA-CREF currently provides annuities with such a structure.
5Milevsky and Young (2002) considers a violation of the return condition that may render zero annuiti-
zation optimal. In particular, in the absence of variable annuities they demonstrate that it can be optimal
to defer annuitization, with deferral more attractive as risk tolerance grows.
2Section 4 extends the simulation literature,6 that calculates the utility gains from an-
nuitization by considering consumers whose utility depends both on present consumption
and a \standard-of-living" to which they have become accustomed.7 In our specication,
whether annuities are more or less valuable under this standard-of-living model than under
the conventional model hinges on whether the initial standard-of-living is large relative to
retirement resources.8 In particular, if the initial standard-of-living at the start of retirement
is large relative to the individuals stock of resources, complete annuitization in the form of
a constant real annuity is not optimal, since it does not allow the individual to optimally
\phase down" from the pre-retirement level of consumption to which she had become accus-
tomed. If, however, the stock of retirement wealth is large relative to the standard-of-living,
annuities are even more valuable than in the usual model of separability.
Section 5 concludes and proposes directions for future research.
2 When is Complete Annuitization Optimal?
The literature on annuities has long been concerned with the \annuity puzzle." This puzzle
consists of the combination of Yaari's nding that, under certain assumptions, complete
annuitization is optimal with the fact that outside of Social Security and dened benet
pension plans, very few U.S. consumers voluntarily annuitize any of their private savings.9
This issue is of interest from a theoretical perspective because it bears upon the issue of
how to model consumer behavior in the presence of uncertainty. It is also of policy interest
because of the gradual shift in the US from dened benet plans, which typically pay out
as an an annuity, to dened contribution plans, that often do not require, or even oer,
retirees the opportunity to annuitize. The role of annuitization is also important in national
dened contribution plans, which have been growing in importance. This section of the
paper adds to the annuity puzzle by deriving much more general conditions under which full
annuitization is optimal. Section 3 will then shed light on potential resolutions to the puzzle
6See for example Kotliko and Spivak (1981), Friedman and Warshawsky (1990), Yagi and Nishigaki
(1993) and Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky and Brown (1999)
7We use the formulation in Diamond and Mirrlees (2000). This formulation involves what is sometimes
referred to as an \internal habit." Dierent models of intertemporal dependence in utility are discussed in,
for example, Dusenberry (1949), Abel (1990), Constantinides (1990), Deaton (1991), Campbell and Cochrane
(1999), Campbell (2002) and Gomes and Michaelides (2003).
8This might occur due to myopic failure to save, or due to adverse health or nancial shocks.
9This assertion is consistent with the large market for what are called variable annuities since these
insurance products do not include a commitment to annuitize accumulations, nor does there appear to be
much voluntary annuitization. See for example Brown and Warshawsky (2001).
3by examining market incompleteness.
2.1 Annuity Demand in a Two Period Model with No Aggregate
Uncertainty
Analysis of intertemporal choice is greatly simplied if resource allocation decisions are made
all at once. Consumers will be willing to commit to a xed plan of expenditures at the start
of time under either of two conditions. The rst condition, standard in the complete market
Arrow-Debreu model is that, at the start of time, consumers are able to trade goods across
time and all states of nature. Alternatively, rst period asset trade obviates future trade
across states of nature if consumers live for only two periods.
Yaari considered annuitization in a continuous time setting where consumers are uncer-
tain only about the date of death. Some results, however, can be seen more simply by
dividing time into two discrete periods: the present, period 1, when the consumer is de-
nitely alive and period 2, when the consumer is alive with probability 1 q. We maintain the
assumption that there is no bequest motive and for the moment assume that only survival to
period 2 is uncertain. In this case, lifetime utility is dened over rst period consumption c1
and planned consumption in the event that the consumer is alive in period 2, c2. By writing
U = U(c1;c2)
we allow for the possibility that the eect of second-period consumption on utility depends
on the level of rst period consumption. This formulation does not require that preferences
satisfy the axioms for U to be an expected value.
We approach both optimal decisions and the welfare evaluation of the availability of annu-
ities by taking a dual approach. That is, we analyze consumer choice in terms of minimizing
expenditures subject to attaining at least a given level of utility. We measure expenditures
in units of rst period consumption. Assume that there is a bond available which returns RB
units of consumption in period 2, whether the consumer is alive or not, in exchange for each
unit of the consumption good in period 1. Assume, in addition, the availability of an annuity
which returns RA in period 2 if the consumer is alive and nothing if the consumer is not alive.
Whereas the bond requires the supplier to pay RB whether or not the saver is alive,10 the
annuity pays out only if the saver is alive. If the annuity were actuarially fair, then we would
have RA =
RB
1 q. Adverse selection and higher transaction costs for paying annuities than
for paying bonds may drive returns below this level. However, because any consumer will
10These values should be interpreted as net of the transaction cost of a consumer buying these assets.
4have a positive probability of dying between now and any future period, thereby relieving
borrowers' obligation, we regard the following as a weak assumption:11
Assumption 1 RA > RB
Denoting by A savings in the form of annuities and by B savings in the form of bonds,
if there is no other income in period 2 (e.g. retirees), then
c2 = RAA + RBB; (1)
and expenditures for lifetime consumption are
E = c1 + A + B: (2)
The expenditure minimization problem can thus be dened as a choice over rst period
consumption and bond and annuity holdings:
min
c1;A;B c1 + A + B (3)
s:t: U(c1;RAA + RBB)   U
By Assumption 1, purchasing annuities and selling bonds in equal numbers would cost
nothing and yield positive consumption when alive in period 2 but leave a debt if dead.
However, such an arbitrage would imply that lenders would be faced with losses in the event
that such a trader failed to live to period 2. The standard Arrow-Debreu assumption is that
planned consumption is in the consumption possibility space. For someone who is dead, this
would require that the consumer not be in debt. In this simple setting the restriction is
therefore that
B  0:
This setup yields two important results. The rst considers improving an arbitrary
allocation while the second refers to the optimal plan.
Result 1 (i) If B > 0; then (i) annuitization can be increased while reducing expenditures
and holding the consumption vector constant. (ii) The solution to problem (3) sets B = 0:
Proof. For (i) a sale of
RA
RB of the bond and purchase of 1 annuity works by Assumption 1
and the denition of c2. For (ii), by(i), a solution with B > 0 fails to minimize expenditures.
Solutions with the inequality reversed are not permitted.
11That RB < RA < RB
1 q is supported empirically by Mitchell et al. (1999). If the rst inequality were
violated, annuities would be dominated by bonds.
5In this two period setting, Part (ii) of Result 1 is an extension of Yaari's result of complete
annuitization to conditions of intertemporal dependence in utility, preferences that may not
satisfy expected utility axioms and actuarially unfair annuities. All that is required is that
there is no bequest motive and that the payout of annuities dominates that of conventional
assets for a survivor.
Part (i) of Result 1 implies that the introduction of annuities reduces expenditures for
constant utility, thereby generating increased welfare (a positive equivalent variation or a
negative compensating variation). We might be interested in two related calculations: the
reduction in expenditures associated with allowing consumers to annuitize a larger fraction
of their savings (particularly from a level of zero) and the benet associated with allowing
consumers to annuitize all of their savings. That is, we want to know the eect on the expen-
diture minimization problem of loosening or removing an additional constraint on problem
(3) that limits annuity opportunities. To examine this issue, we restate the expenditure
minimization problem with a constraint on the availability of annuities as:
min
c1;A;B : c1 + A + B (4)
s:t: : U(c1;RAA + RBB)   U
A   A: (5)
B  0 (6)
We know that utility maximizing consumers will take advantage of an opportunity to
annuitize as long as second-period consumption is positive. Positive planned consumption






= 1 for t = 1;2
We can see from the optimization (4) that allowing consumers previously unable to annu-
itize any wealth to place a small amount of their savings into annuities (incrementing  A from
zero) leaves second period consumption unchanged (since the cost of the marginal second-
period consumption is unchanged and so too, therefore, is the optimal level of consumption
6in both periods). By Result 1, in this case, a small increase in  A generates a very small










leaving consumption unchanged: dc2 = RAdA + RBdB = RA   RA
RB
RB = 0:
The eect on expenditures is equal to (1  
RA
RB) < 0: This is the welfare gain from
increasing the limit on available annuities for an optimizing consumer with positive bond
holdings.
If constraint (5) is removed altogether, the price of second period consumption in units
of rst period consumption falls from 1
RB to 1
RA. With a change in the cost of marginal
second-period consumption, its level will adjust. Thus the cost savings is made up of two
parts. One part is the savings while nancing the same consumption bundle as when there is
no annuitization and the second is the savings from adapting the consumption bundle to the
change in prices. We can measure the welfare gain in going from no annuities to potentially
unlimited annuities by integrating the derivative of the expenditure function between the
two prices:






where c2 is compensated demand arising from minimization of expenditures equal to c1+c2p2
subject to the utility constraint without a distinction between asset types.
Equation (7) implies that consumers who save more (have larger second-period consump-
tion) benet more from the ability to annuitize completely:
Result 2 The benet of allowing complete annuitization (rather than no annuitization) is
greater for consumer i than for consumer j if consumer i's compensated demand for second
period consumption (equivalently, compensated savings) exceeds consumer j's for any price
of second period consumption.
2.2 Extending the Model to Many Periods and States with Com-
plete Markets
While a two-period model with no aggregate uncertainty oers the virtue of simplicity, real
consumers face a more complicated decision setting. In particular, they face many periods
7of potential consumption and each period may have several possible states of nature. For
example, a 65 year old consumer has some probability of surviving to be a healthy and active
80 year old, some chance of nding herself sick and in a nursing home at age 80 and some
chance of not being alive at all at age 80. Moreover, rates of return on some assets are
stochastic.
The result of the optimality of complete annuitization survives subdivision of the ag-
gregated future dened by c2 into many future periods and states. A particularly simple
subdivision would be to add a third period, so that survival to period 2 occurs with prob-
ability 1   q2 and to period 3 with probability (1   q2)(1   q3). In this case, bonds and
annuities which pay out separately in period 2 with rates RB2 and RA2, and period 3 with
rates RB3 and RA3 are sucient to obviate trade in periods 2 or 3. That is, dening bonds
and annuities purchased in period 1 with the appropriate subscript,12
E = c1 + A2 + A3 + B2 + B3
c2 = RB2B2 + RA2A2;
c3 = RB3B3 + RA3A3:
If Assumption 1 is modied to hold period by period, Result 1 extends trivially. Note
that we have set up what we will call \Arrow bonds" (here B2 and B3) by combining two
states of nature that dier in no other way except whether this consumer is alive. \Arrow
annuities" which also recognize whether this consumer is alive complete the set of true Arrow
securities of standard theory.
In order to take the next logical step, we can continue to treat c1 as a scalar and interpret
c2; B2; and A2 as vectors with entries corresponding to arbitrarily many (possibly innity)
future periods (t  T), within arbitrarily many states of nature (!  
). RA2 (RB2) is
then a matrix with columns corresponding to annuities (bonds) and rows corresponding to
payouts by period and state of nature. Thus, the assumption of no aggregate uncertainty
can be dropped. Multiple states of nature might refer to uncertainty about aggregate issues
such as output, or individual specic issues beyond mortality such as health.13 In order to
extend the analysis, we need to assume that the consumer is suciently \small" that for
each state of nature where the consumer is alive, there exists a state where the consumer is
12Implicitly, we are assuming that if markets reopened, the relative prices would be the same as are
available in the initial trading period
13For a discussion of annuity payments that are partially dependent on health status, see Warshawsky,
Spillman and Murtaugh (forthcoming).
8dead and the equilibrium prices are otherwise identical. Completeness of markets still allows
construction of Arrow bonds which represent the combination of two Arrow securities.
Annuities with payos in only one event state are contrary to our conventional percep-
tion of (and name for) annuities as paying out in every year until death. However, with
complete markets, separate annuities with payouts in each year can be combined to create
such securities. It is clear that the analysis of the two-period model extends to this setting,
provided we maintain the standard Arrow-Debreu market structure and assumptions that
do not allow an individual to die in debt. In addition to the description of the optimum, the
formula for the gain from allowing more annuitization holds for state-by-state increases in
the level of allowed level of annuitization. Moreover, by choosing any particular price path
from the prices inherent in bonds to the prices inherent in annuities, we can measure the
gain in going from no annuitization to full annuitization. This parallels the evaluation of the
price changes brought about by a lumpy investment (see Diamond and McFadden (1974)).
In this section, we have extended the Yaari result of complete annuitization to conditions
of aggregate uncertainty, actuarially unfair (but positive) annuity premiums and intertem-
porally dependent utility that need not satisfy the expected utility axioms. We have also
shown that increasing the extent of available annuitization increases welfare for individuals
who hold conventional bonds.14 These results deepen the annuity puzzle by demonstrating
that complete annuitization is optimal under a wider range of assumptions about individual
preferences. Thus, given available empirical evidence about the small size of the private
annuity market, a natural question is: when might individuals not fully annuitize? This is
explored in the next section.
3 When Is Partial Annuitization Optimal?
In Section 2, we explored annuity demand in a setting with complete Arrow securities - both
Arrow bonds and Arrow annuities were assumed to exist for every event. With such com-
plete markets and without a bequest motive, the sucient conditions for full optimization
were very weak - just that the added costs of administering annuities were less than the
value of security payments not made because of the deaths of investors. The full annuitiza-
tion result depends on market completeness. In settings without market completeness, we
14The generalization of Result 2 to this case requires the very strong condition that after the present,
consumption for agent i exceeds that of agent j state of nature by state of nature. That i's consumption
grows at a greater rate than j's is not sucient: allowing complete annuitization may yield reduction in many
dierent prices by increasing any of many ratios At!
At!+Bt!. In general, these price changes are non-monotonic
in time past period 1.
9consider sucient conditions for partial annuitization - the inclusion of some annuitization
in optimized demand. We consider two alternative tpes of annuity market incompleteness.
First, we consider a setting with complete Arrow bonds but only some Arrow annuities.
Then we consider a setting with complete Arrow bonds and compound annuities - ones that
involve payos in many events rather than being Arrow annuities. The rst setting relates
the annuity puzzle to the circumstance that insurance rms provide limited opportunities for
annuitization. The second setting explores the puzzle in annuity demand given the annuity
products that do exist.
3.1 Incomplete Annuity Markets (When Trade Occurs Once)
3.1.1 Incomplete Arrow Annuities
The logic of the argument in Section 2 was straightforward. Whenever there was a purchase
of an Arrow bond, the cost of meeting a given utility level could be reduced by substituting
purchase of an Arrow annuity for an Arrow bond. Thus with complete sets of both Ar-
row bonds and Arrow annuities, no Arrow bond would be purchased, implying that all of
savings was invested in Arrow annuities. This line of argument will not result in complete
annuitization if the set of Arrow annuities is not complete. That is, if the only way to get
consumption in some future event is by purchasing an Arrow bond (since no Arrow annuity
exists for that event), then some purchase of Arrow bonds for that event will be part of the
optimum when the optimum has positive consumption in that event. Conversely, as long as
any Arrow annuities exist, the optimum will include some annuitization.
3.1.2 Incomplete Compound Annuities
Most real world annuity markets require that a consumer purchase a particular time path
of payouts, thereby combining in a single security a particular \compound" combination of
Arrow securities. For example, the U.S. Social Security system provides annuities that are
indexed to the Consumer Price Index and thus oer a constant real payout (ignoring the
role of the earnings test). Privately purchased immediate life annuities are usually xed in
nominal terms, or oer a predetermined nominal slope such as a 5 percent nominal increase
per year. Variable annuities link the payout to the performance of a particular underlying
portfolio of assets and combine Arrow securities in that way. CREF annuities are also
participating, which means that the payout also varies with the actual mortality experience
for the class of investors.
Numerous simulation studies have examined the utility gains from annuities with these
10types of payouts that combine Arrow securities in a particular way. To consider such lifetime
annuities in this setup, we continue to assume a double set of states of nature, diering only
in whether the particular consumer we are analyzing is alive. We continue to assume a
complete set of Arrow bonds and consider the eect of the availability of particular types
of annuities. We also need to consider whether the return from annuities and bonds can be
reinvested (markets are open) or must be consumed (markets are closed) In general, we will
lose the result that complete annuitization is optimal. Nevertheless, we will get optimality
of complete annuitization of initial savings in real annuities satisfying the return condition
provided that optimal consumption is rising over time and markets for bonds are open. In a
more general setting we examine sucient conditions for the result that the optimal holding
of annuities is not zero.
To illustrate these points, we consider a three-period model with no aggregate uncertainty
and a complete set of bonds. Then we will show how the results generalize. If there are no
annuities, then the expenditure minimization problem is:
min
c1;A;B : c1 + B2 + B3 (8)
s:t: : U(c1;RB2B2;RB3B3)   U
That is, we have:
c2 = RB2B2;
c3 = RB3B3:
With the assumption of innite marginal utility at zero consumption, all three of c1, B2 and
B3 are positive. Now assume that there is a single available annuity, A, that pays given
amounts in the two periods. Assume further that there is no opportunity for trade after the
initial contracting. The minimization problem is now
min
c1;A;B : c1 + B2 + B3 + A (9)
s:t: : U(c1;RB2B2 + RA2A;RB3B3 + RA3A)   U
c2 = RB2B2 + RA2A;
c3 = RB3B3 + RA3A:
Before proceeding, we must revise the superior return condition for Arrow annuities that
RAt! > RBt! : 8t!. A more appropriate formulation for the return on a complex security
that combines Arrow securities to exceed bond returns is that for any quantity of the payout
stream provided by the annuity, the cost is less if bought with the annuity than if the same
11stream is bought through bonds. Dene by ` a row vector of ones with length equal to
the number of states of nature distinguished by bonds, let the set of bonds continue to
be represented by a vector with elements corresponding to the columns of the matrix of
returns RB and let RA be a vector of annuity payouts multiplying the scalar A to dene
state-by-state payouts.
Assumption 3 For any annuitized asset A and any collection of conventional assets B;RAA =
RBB ) A < `B.
For example, if there is an annuity that pays RA2 per unit of annuity in the second period








linearity of expenditures, this implies that any consumption vector that may be purchased
strictly through annuities is less expensive when nanced strictly through annuities than
when purchased by a set of bonds with matching payos.15
Given the return assumption and the presence of positive consumption in all periods, it
is clear that the cost goes down from the introduction of the rst small amount of annuity,
which can always be done without changing consumption. Thus we can also conclude that
the optimum (including the constraint of not dying in debt) always includes some annuity
purchase. It is also clear that full annuitization may not be optimal if the implied consump-
tion pattern with complete annuitization is worth changing by purchasing a bond. That is,
denoting partial derivatives of the utility function with subscripts, optimizing rst period
consumption given full annuitization, we would have the rst order condition:
U1(c1;RA2A;RA3A) = RA2U2(c1;RA2A;RA3A) + RA3U3(c1;RA2A;RA3A):
Purchasing a bond would be worthwhile if we satisfy either of the conditions:
U1(c1;RA2A;RA3A) < RB2U2(c1;RA2A;RA3A) (10)
or
U1(c1;RA2A;RA3A) < RB3U3(c1;RA2A;RA3A) (11)
By our return assumption, we can not satisfy both of these conditions at the same time,
but we might satisfy one of them. That is, the optimum will involve holding some of the
annuitized asset and may involve some bonds, but not all of them.
15This assumption leaves open the possibility considered below that both bond and annuity markets are
incomplete and some consumption plans can be nanced only through annuities.
12It is clear that these results generalize to a setting with complete Arrow bonds and some
compound annuities with many periods and many states of nature. We show below that
expenditure minimization requires that there must be positive purchases of at least one
annuity.
Lemma 1 Consider an asset A with nite, non-negative payouts RA. Any consumption
plan [c1 c2]0 with positive consumption in every state of nature can be nanced by a combina-
tion of rst period consumption, a positive holding of A and another strictly non-negative
consumption plan.




]0 and dene the scalar  = min(c2   RA).
Now c2 = RA + Z, where Z is weakly positive.
We now have a weaker version of Result 1:
Result 3 If marginal utilities are innite at zero consumption (Assumption 2 holds) and
there exist annuities with non-negative payouts which satisfy Assumption 3, then (i) when
no annuities are held, a small increase in annuitization reduces expenditures, holding utility
constant. Also, then (ii) expenditure minimization implies positive holdings of at least one
annuity.
Proof. Suppose that the optimal plan (c1;A;B) features A = 0. Then there are two pos-
sibilities: rst, consumption might be zero in some future state of nature. By Assumption 2
this implies innitely negative utility and fails to satisfy the utility constraint. If consumption
is positive in every state of nature, then consumption is a linear combination of all strictly
positive linear combinations of the Arrow bonds. But then since some strictly positive con-
sumption plan can be nanced by annuities, by Assumption 3 and Lemma 1, expenditures can
be reduced holding consumption constant by a trade of some linear combination of the bonds
for some combination of annuities with strictly positive payouts. This contradicts optimality
of the proposed solution.
Part (i) of Result 3 states that if consumers are willing to commit to lifetime expenditures
all at once, then starting from a position of zero annuitization, a small purchase of any
annuity (with a good return) increases welfare. This applies to any annuity with returns in
excess of the underlying nonannuitized assets, no matter how distasteful the payout stream.
Part (ii) is the corollary that optimal annuity holding is always positive. Lemma 1 shows
that up to some point, annuity purchases do not distort consumption, so that their only
eect is to reduce expenditures, as in the case where annuities markets are complete. When
a large fraction of savings is annuitized, if the supply of annuitized assets fails to match
13demand, annuitization distorts consumption and some conventional assets may be preferred.
From the proof of Result 3, it follows that the annuitized version of any conventional asset
(with higher returns) that might be part of an optimal portfolio dominates the underlying
asset.
3.2 Incomplete Annuity Markets With Trade More than Once
The setup so far has not allowed a second period of trade. However, if the existing annuities'
payout trajectories are unattractive, households may wish to modify the consumption plan
yielded by the dividend 
ows purchased at retirement through trade at later dates. We
nd in this case that positive annuitization remains optimal as long as conventional markets
are complete and a revised form of the superior returns to annuitization condition holds.
With incomplete conventional markets, it is possible for liquidity concerns to render zero
annuitization optimal.
3.2.1 Trade in Many Periods with Complete Conventional Markets
Suppose that trade in bonds is allowed after the rst period, with bond prices consistent
with the returns that were present for trade before the rst period. To begin, we assume that
there is not an annuity available at any future trading time and that the consumer can save
out of annuity receipts but can not sell the remaining portion of the annuity. Since there
would be no further trade without an annuity purchase out of initial wealth, the optimum
without any annuity is unchanged. Utility at the optimum, assuming some annuity purchase
and consumption of the annuity return, raises welfare as above. Thus we conclude that
the result that some annuity purchase is optimal (Result 3) carries over to the setting with
complete bond markets at the start and further trading opportunities in bonds that involve
no change in the terms of bond transactions. The possibility of reinvesting annuity returns
can further enhance the value of annuity purchases and may result in the optimality of full
annuitization.
Returning to the three period example with no uncertainty beyond individual mortality,
a sucient condition for complete annuitization at the start is that the consumption stream
associated with complete annuitization at the rst trading point was such that the individual
would wish to save, rather than dissave. This is true even if one of the inequalities (10) or
(11) is violated. To examine this issue, we now set up the expenditure minimization problem
with retrading, denoting saving at the end of the second period by Z.
14min
c1;A;B;Z : c1 + B2 + B3 + A (12)
s:t: : U(c1;RB2B2 + RA2A   Z;RB3B3 + RA3A + (RB3=RB2)Z)   U:
The restriction of not dying in debt is the nonnegativity of consumption if A is set equal to
zero: 16
B2; B3; Z  0
RB2B2  0
RB3B3 + (RB3=RB2)Z  0
The assumption that dissaving would not be attractive given full annuitization is
RB2U2(c1;RA2A;RA3A)  RB3U3(c1;RA2A;RA3A) (13)
This condition can be readily satised for preferences satisfying a suitable relationship
between (implicit) utility discount rates and interest rates and the result extends with many
future periods, as long as trade is allowed in each. To show this, we consider as a special case
a world with T   1 future periods and no uncertainty except individual mortality, so that
future consumption conditional on survival can be described by a vector c2 with one element
for each period up to T, beyond which no individual survives: c2 = [c2;c3:::cT]0. Consumers
have access to \Arrow" bonds and a single annuity product which pays out a constant real
amount of RAA per period, where A is the amount of the annuity purchased in period 1. We
assume that no annuities are available after the rst period, but that future bond trades are
allowed. By completeness of bond markets, we can consider the set of bonds to be described
by T  1 securities, each of which pays out at a rate of (1+r)t 1 at date t only. We assume
further that there is a constant real interest rate of r on bonds and that the rate of return
condition (Assumption 3) is satised. That is, the internal rate of return on the annuity,
with periodic payouts multiplied by survival probabilities, exceeds r.
Because Assumptions 2 (innite disutility from zero consumption in any future period)
and 3 (any consumption plan that can be nanced by annuities alone is nanced most cheaply
by annuities alone) are met:
16B3 can be negative if Z is positive. However, a budget-neutral reduction in Z and increase in B3, holding
A constant, then yields equivalent consumption, so there is no restriction in disallowing negative B3. If B3
is non-negative, then Z must be zero as long as B2 is positive, or else constant consumption with reduced
expenditures could be obtained at a lower price by reducing B2 and increasing A. That is, there are no
savings out of bonds.
15Result 4 The solution to the expenditure minimization problem with markets as described
above features A > 0.
Proof. Follows immediately from Result 3.
By the no bankruptcy constraint, consumers may undo annuitization by saving if annu-
itization renders consumption too weighted towards early periods, but not by borrowing if
annuitization renders consumption too weighted to later periods. With bonds liquid, the
liquidity constraint given a constant real annuity requires that expenditures on consumption
up to any date  must be less than total bond holdings plus annuity receipts up to that date,












This induces one constraint for every period in which consumption is bound from above
by the required annuity. Annuities are costly in optimization terms because they contribute
to these constraints.
The expenditure minimization problem becomes:
min
c1;A;B c1 + A + B (15)
s:t: U(c1;c2(A;B))   U
s:t: equation (14) is satised.
Result 5 If optimal consumption is weakly increasing over time, then complete initial an-
nuitization is optimal. That is, initial net bond purchases are zero.
Proof. With non-decreasing consumption, constraint 14 is satised when the lifetime
budget constraint is satised. That is, bonds maturing as needed to satisfy (17) can be
purchased from future savings. Hence, if net bond holdings are greater than zero, expenditures
can be reduced and utility increased by an additional purchase of  units of A and sale of

RA
RB2 >  units of B2.
Without the annuity, expenditures are given by










With annuities, the cost of a consumption plan is equal to the cost of annuitized con-
sumption plus the dierence between annuitized consumption and actual consumption in
every period:
E(c;A) = c1 + A +
T X
t=1
(ct   RAA)(1 + r)
1 t; (17)
16where RA is the per-period annuity payout. For t > 1, if consumption is less than the annuity
payout, the dierence can be used to purchase consumption at later dates, with the relative
prices given by bond returns. If consumption is greater than the annuity payout, then a
bond maturing at date t must be purchased.
Adding the assumptions of additively separable preferences over consumption, exponen-
tial discounting and access to an actuarially fair constant real annuity generates additional
results. If 1   mt  t
s=2(1   qs) is the probability of survival to period t, then actuarial
fairness implies that the cost per unit of the annuity is equal to the survival-adjusted present










t=2(1   mt)(1 + r)1 t: (18)
Assumption 3 applies as long as there is a positive probability of death by the end of T
periods because the cost of consuming any plan RAA per period past period 1 with annuities
is A PT
t=2(1 mt)(1+r)1 t. This is less than A PT
t=2(1+r)1 t, the cost of purchasing A per period with
conventional securities.





t 1(1   mt)u(ct); (19)
Where u0 > 0; u00 < 0; limct!0 u0 = 1; and  is the rate of time preference.
Result 6 For the dual utility maximization problem with xed expenditures, if the optimal
level of annuitization A is less than initial wealth savings, so that there are positive initial
expenditures on bonds, an increase in  yields an increase in optimal A relative to savings.
Proof. With an increase in , for any periods s0 > s, the ratio of consumption induced by
initial period consumption and investment
cs0
cs must increase. This follows since the ratio of
marginal utilities increases with  and the ratio can be increased with a small budget-neutral
exchange of Bs for Bs0. Hence, planned consumption with the increase in  must be equal to
the original consumption plan plus a weakly increasing sequence with negative elements for
all dates up to some date t. By the result above, the old consumption plan is revised with
minimal expenditures by selling bonds with maturity less than t and increasing A.
Result 7 If (1 + r)  1, complete initial annuitization is optimal.
17Proof. By result 6, it is sucient to show that this is true for (1 + r) = 1. For
complete annuitization to be suboptimal, it must be the case that there exists some t for which
purchasing a bond with maturity at date t provides greater marginal utility than purchase of
the real annuity with consumption of each period's annuity receipt, or:
9t > 1 : 
t 1(1 + r)
t 1u
0(RAA)(1   mt) >
PT
t=2 t 1(1   mt)u0(RAA)
PT
t=2(1   mt)(1 + r)1 t :
) 
t 1(1 + r)
t 1(1   mt) >
PT
t=2 t 1(1   mt)
PT
t=2(1   mt)(1 + r)1 t:
If (1+r) = 1, then this is impossible, because the left hand side is less than or equal to one
(by non-negative mortality) and the right hand side equals one. Note that this applies to any
later bond purchases so that it is concluded optimal to have constant consumption.
If uncertainty were introduced, for complete annuitization to remain optimal, we would
require that marginal utility in every state of nature not be so large to justify the cost of
adding consumption in that period through a bond rather than adding consumption in every
period through the constant real annuity (which we might assume would pay out a constant
amount across states of nature as well as periods).
3.2.2 Future Purchase of Annuities and the Possibility of Zero Initial Annuiti-
zation
As we have seen, the possibility of future trade in bonds can increase the demand for an-
nuities. Conversely, the possibility of future trades in annuities can decrease the demand
for initial annuities, replacing it with a later demand for annuities. Continuing to assume
complete bond markets, assume that real annuities can be purchased starting in period one
and, in a reopened market, also in period two (this possibility is addressed in Milevsky and
Young (2002)). If the internal rate of return (unadjusted for mortality) is larger for the
delayed annuity, then it is possible that it is worthwhile to delay annuity purchase, if the
survival probability for the rst period is large enough.
Consider the case considered above where the only annuity available is a constant real
annuity and suppose an individual lives for at most three periods. If the interest rate on
bonds is zero, an annuity purchased in period one pays $0.55 in periods two and three and an
annuity purchase in period two pays $1.50 in period three,17 then some consumption plans
are more cheaply purchased by placing all period one savings in a bond maturing in period
two and investing all period two savings in the annuity available in period two.
17Such an unrealistic payout scenario could in principle be a product of a selection process whereby early
annuitizers are longer lived than late annuitizers.
183.2.3 Incomplete Markets for Nonannuitized Assets and the Possibility of Zero
Annuitization
In the original Yaari model, stochastic length of life was the only source of uncertainty. Med-
ical expenses and nursing home costs represent large uncertainties for many consumers. If
insurance for these events is incomplete, this will aect the demand for annuities if they are
less liquid than bonds or if, for some reason, the available annuities' payouts are relatively
large in low marginal utility states. The general incomplete markets sucient condition
guaranteeing positive annuity purchases is that there is an annuity or combination of an-
nuities available which pays out in all the same states of nature as a nonannuitized asset,
with payouts that are weakly greater state-by-state. In the real world, this seemingly strong
condition could be met by an annuitized version of an underlying asset such as shares in
a particular stock or mutual fund. However, with complete Arrow pure bond markets and
given survival probabilities, such that price-weighted marginal utility is equated across future
states, as long as the optimal plan involves some consumption throughout life and as long
as the return condition is satised, it remains the case that some annuitization is optimal.
Basically, the argument above that the minimal consumption over all possible states and
times is best nanced by an annuity continues to hold.
With life expectancy as the only risk, individuals can receive information about remaining
life expectancy that is not recognized in the market structure. Again, a greater liquidity for
bonds would aect annuity demand. In this case, there can be zero demand for annuities
if the news implies that the maximal possible length of life has decreased - that is, that
the minimal consumption over the initially possible ages is zero. Conversely, if the news
changes the probabilities of survival, without shortening the possible maximal life, then
some annuitization remains optimal, by the same argument as above. In a three period
model with life expectancy news, we derive a necessary condition for zero annuitization.
Suppose that in period 1, a consumer expects to survive to period 2 with probability
1   q2 and to period 3 with probability (1   q2)(1   q3). However, the consumer knows that
in period 2, the conditional probability of survival to period 3 will be updated to zero (\bad
health news") with probability  or to
1 q3
1  (\good health news") with probability 1 . A
single compound annuity is available in period one, paying RA2 and RA3 in periods two and
three, respectively. If the bonds fail to distinguish between the two health conditions, the
consumer will sell whatever bonds pay o in period three on obtaining bad health news in
period two, but will be unable to cash out the illiquid third period annuity claim.
Suppose that without annuitization, the consumer divides period one savings between
the bonds maturing in periods two and three such that no trade is undertaken in period
19two if the consumer obtains good health news. Consumption in period two is thus given
by RB2B2 if there is good health news and RB2B2 +
RB2
RB3RB3B3 if the health news is bad.
Assume that the consumer's utility is given by U(c1;c2;c3) = u(c1) + u(c2) + 2u(c3). The
marginal utility of savings in either bond is thus:
RB2(u
0(RB2(B2 + B3)) + (1   )u
0(RB2B2): (20)
Zero annuity purchase is optimal if and only if expression (20) is greater than or equal
to the marginal utility of a small purchase of the annuity. This latter value is simplied
by noting that optimal allocation across periods two and three conditional on good health
news imply RB2u0(RB2B2) = RB3u0(RB3B3). The marginal utility of a small purchase of
the annuity is:
(RA2u





Expression (20) can exceed expression (21) and hence zero annuitization can be optimal




RB3 > 1. This
can occur if the annuities' payouts are suciently graded towards future payouts relative
to the bonds, the probability of bad health news  is suciently large and u is not too
concave. Hence, in this particular incomplete markets setting, zero annuitization, partial
annuitization and complete annuitization are all consistent with utility maximization without
further assumptions.18.
4 Special Cases: The Welfare Gains from Annuitiza-
tion with Additive and Standard-of-Living Utility
Much of the literature on annuities has focused on the welfare gains that can be generated
by providing access to annuity markets. These simulations have typically assumed that
individuals have intertemporally additive utility that exhibits constant relative risk aversion.
The gains from annuitization have been shown to be quite substantial. For example, Brown,
Mitchell and Poterba (2002) show that a consumer with log utility would nd access to an
actuarially fair real annuity market equivalent to nearly a 50 percent increase in unannuitized
wealth.
18In this example zero annuitization cannot be optimal unless the support for being alive changes in period
2. For example, uncertainty about medical expenses might change the extent of annuitization, but would
not eliminate annuitization. With psychic or monetary costs to annuitization, demand suciently close to
zero could result in an optimum no annuitization at all
20We saw in Section 3.2.1 that under these conditions, a consumer for whom discounting is
a weaker eect than interest rates will annuitize completely. In this section, we discuss the
welfare consequences of annuitization in this \industry standard" case. We then expand on
the prior literature by examining annuity valuations when utility is no longer intertemporally
separable. In particular, we consider a case in which utility is dependent on a standard-
of-living, i.e., utility in any period is a function of current and past consumption. We
calculate the welfare gains from annuitization under both sets of assumptions and show how
a standard-of-living eect can make annuities more or less valuable, depending on how large
the initial standard-of-living is relative to available retirement resources. This relationship
plays a major role in the level of savings as well as the attractiveness of constant consumption.
We consider as in Section 3.2.1 a world with T   1 future periods and no uncertainty other
than time of death. We evaluate the welfare consequences of the required purchase of A
units of an actuarially fair annuity with constant real return RA in each future period when
there are no future opportunities to purchase annuities, but bonds may be purchased both
in the present and in the future.
As discussed above, a small increase in A from zero has no eect on consumption, so that
the CV from incremental annuitization from 0 to a small number  is equal to the dierence
between E(c;0) and E(c;):
dE
dA




1 t) < 0: (22)
The inequality follows from equations (16) and (18) as long as mT > 0:
The welfare eects of larger increases in annuitization are more dicult to sign because
they may constrain consumption. Below, we consider the eects for particular utility func-
tions. We also consider the value of a complete annuity market.
4.1 The Gains from Annuitization under \Usual Assumptions"
If utility is additively separable and features exponential discounting, as in specication (19),
then the extension to Result 7 follows from the proof above:
Result 8 If (1 + r)  1, then any increase in annuitization in the range A 2 [0;E   c1] is
welfare enhancing.
For more impatient consumers (lower ), we solve for the optimal fraction of savings put
into annuities numerically. Results are detailed below.
21Beyond the results we have above, making statements about the size of EV for a move
from complete annuitization to zero annuitization is dicult, because in general, this calcu-
lation must take into account the period-by-period positive wealth constraints summarized
in equation (14). That said, a plausible conjecture, based on Result 6 is that valuation will
increase in the patience parameter , which should push consumption later in life. Further,
in cases where optimal consumption is decreasing over time, increased smoothing should
increase valuation. Hence, for (1+r)  1; we should expect valuation to increase with any
parameter of risk aversion, because the desire for decreasing consumption, which makes the
liquidity constraints brought on by annuitization bind, would then be tempered by a desire
for consumption smoothing. We conrm these intuitions below with numerical examples.
4.2 The Gains from Annuitization when Utility Depends on a
standard-of-living
Additive separability of utility does not sit well with intuition. For example, life in a stu-
dio apartment with no car is surely more tolerable for someone used to living in a studio
apartment without a car than for someone who was forced by a negative income shock to
abandon a four bedroom house and an Escalade for a studio apartment and no car. In this
section, we consider an extreme and hence illustrative, example of intertemporal dependence
in the utility function, taken from Diamond and Mirrlees (2000). The intuition behind this
formulation is that it is not the level of present consumption, but the level relative to past
consumption that matters. We consider the ratio of present to past consumption, but the
dierence could also be considered. In choosing how to allocate resources across periods,
consumers with such utility trade o immediate gratication from consumption not only
against a lifetime budget constraint, but also against the eects of consumption early in life














If individuals' subjective standard of living is constant (i.e. if  = 0) we are back in
the additively separable case. A positive value of  indicates that past consumption makes
individuals less satised with a given level of present consumption.
In the absence of the positive wealth constraints (14), the marginal utility of consumption
in any period incorporates two eects not present in the additively separable case: (i) the
22eect of the present standard-of-living on present marginal utility and (ii) the eect of present
consumption on future periods' utility through subsequent standards of living. Under this
























We note that if lim ct
st !0 u0(ct) = 1, then Assumption 2 holds and Result 4 applies for
nite s1, so some annuitization is optimal.
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k (1   mk):
For 
 > 1; eect (i) will tend to push consumption towards later periods relative to the
no standard ( = 0) case if the standard-of-living is increasing over time since a higher
standard-of-living increases the marginal utility of consumption. If the standard-of-living
is decreasing over time and 
  2; then eect (i) will tend to push consumption to earlier
periods. For 
 < 2; the eect is ambiguous.
Eect (ii) will tend to push consumption towards later periods in life since later consump-
tion raises the standard-of-living in fewer periods. Hence, the result of complete annuitization
when the discount rate is less than the interest rate, Result 7, continues to hold if s is con-
stant or decreasing over the period of annuitization. This occurs if the initial value of s
is small and the required level of utility,  U, is large. If the initial value s1 is suciently
large relative to the expenditures required to attain  U, then the smoothing implied by risk
aversion may undo the result by rendering optimal consumption relatively decreasing over
time.
With the constraint that the only annuity available pays out a constant real amount, rel-
ative valuations are particularly dicult to calculate with standard-of-living eects, because
the intertemporal eects compound the diculty of the multiple positive wealth constraints.
However, we conjecture that parameter changes that tend to defer optimal consumption will
tend to increase valuation. Hence, simulated valuations should tend to be increasing in :
Further, large s1 should yield decreasing valuation and small s1 increasing valuation, with
both eects magnied by 
.
4.3 Numerically Estimated Magnitudes of Welfare Eects




 for both the additively separable and standard-of-living eect cases. We assume
23exponential discounting and a 
at yield curve. In the separable case, this gives constant
relative risk aversion utility, with a relative risk aversion of 









1 mk. In the standard-of-living eect case, both risk aversion
and intertemporal substitution are complicated by the intertemporal utility linkage.
We calculate the utility gains from annuitization for a single, 65 year old male. We use
survival probabilities from the U.S. Social Security Administration for the cohort turning
age 65 in 1999, modied (to ease computation) so that death occurs for sure by age 100.
We use a real interest rate r of 0.03 and vary 
 and . We normalize wealth at age 65 to be
100 in all cases. We nd the consumption vector that solves the expenditure minimization
problem numerically using standard optimization techniques.19
In Table 1, we report on nine simulations. The rst three simulations, in the top panel of
the table, report results for a consumer with the usual additively separable utility function.
The middle panel contains three simulations for an individual with a standard-of-living utility
function. In this case, the consumer retires with a stock of wealth that is 20 times larger than
the standard-of-living to which they are accustomed at age 65. Specically, the consumer
has a starting wealth of 100 and standard-of-living s1 equal to 5. We set  (from equation
(23)) equal to 1.
The last three simulations, in the bottom panel, are also for a consumer with preferences
that depend on their standard-of-living. In this case, however, the stock of wealth is only
twice as large as the standard-of-living to which they are accustomed. Specically, we set s1
equal to 50, while we continue to hold wealth at 100 and  equal to 1.
Within each panel, we examine three cases to show how results are aected by 
 and .
The rst case in each panel is our \base case" for which 
 = 1 (log utility) and  = 1:03 1
(and thus is the discount rate is equal to the real interest rate). We then explore how results
change when the individual discounts the future more heavily by setting  = 1:10 1. The
third case returns  to its value of 1:03 1 and explores change of 
 to a value of 2. Note that
for the separable utility cases, 
 represents the coecient of relative risk aversion. While
we use the same values of 
 for the standard-of-living eect cases, it cannot be interpreted
as the risk aversion coecient. We assume that the consumer cannot borrow against future
annuity receipts, but may save annuity payments in bonds with the interest rate of .03.
For each of the nine simulations, we calculate four values. In the rst column, we report
the equivalent variation (EV) for fully annuitizing in a constant real annuity. In other words,
19Inspection of case two shows suboptimally increasing consumption in the last few years of life. The
solutions are approximations with only very small deviations from equalized marginal utility to price ratios
tolerated for years in which consumption is not equal to the real annuity.
24the numbers in column (1) represent the increase in wealth required to hold utility constant
while moving all wealth from a constant real annuity to conventional bonds. In the second
column, we report the fraction of wealth that is optimally placed in the real annuity instead of
bonds if a continuous choice over annuitization levels is permitted. In column (3), we report
the equivalent variation associated with the optimal amount of annuitization as reported
in column (2). Thus, column (3) represents the increase in wealth required to hold utility
constant while moving from having the optimal amount annuitized in a real annuity, to
having all of wealth in bonds. The nal column reports the gains from annuitization (again
in the form of an equivalent variation) for the case in which the individual is permitted
to choose an optimal payout trajectory, i.e., they are no longer constrained to purchase a
constant real annuity.
In addition to the four welfare measures presented in table 1, we graph the consumption
proles for each of the nine cases in gures 1 through 9. Each graph plots the optimal
consumption with dierent levels and types of annuitization: the series plotted with circles is
optimal consumption without annuitization; the series plotted in squares represents optimal
consumption with an equivalent utility level, but with 100 percent of wealth (100 units) put
into a constant real annuity; the series plotted in triangles represents optimal consumption
with the same level of expenditures as in the complete annuitization case (rather than the
same level of consumption or utility) but with the consumer free to place an optimal fraction
of wealth in the constant real annuity and the remainder in bonds. The series plotted in s
represents optimal consumption when all initial wealth (again 100 units) is placed in annuities
which are allowed any desired time shape. A rough estimate of the magnitude of EVs can be
obtained by observing the dierence in trajectories between the circled consumption plan and
the other, annuitized consumption plans. When optimal consumption is sharply decreasing,
the constraints implied by (18) bind consumption away from the optimal path. In these
cases, the price benet of annuitization is largely oset by the constraints. When optimal
unconstrained (zero annuitization) consumption is hump shaped and less steeply decreasing,
the constraints impose less costs, so the net benet to annuitization is greater.
Turning our attention to the results, we see that the rst case is for a consumer with
intertemporally separable preferences, log utility and a discount rate equal to the interest
rate. For this individual, a constant real annuity provides an optimal consumption path.
Therefore, all wealth is annuitized and the EV is the same for columns (1), (3) and (4).
Specically, we nd that the individual would require a 44 percent increase in wealth to
be made as well o with no annuities as he would be if permitted to use his full wealth to
purchase a constant real annuity. This result is very close to those found in the existing
25literature, despite the truncation of the maximum lifespan at age 100.20 Figure 1 demon-
strates the gains from annuitization graphically, as the consumption path provided by the
constant real annuity is optimal given actuarially fair pricing of consumption. Hence, there
is no benet to 
exibility in annuity payout trajectory.
The second case considers a dierent discount factor of 1.10 1, such that the consumer
now discounts the future more heavily. This consumer would still prefer to place 100 percent
of her wealth in a real annuity than to invest entirely in bonds. However, the gains from full
annuitization are much lower, with an EV of only 19. This decline in the value of the annuity
arises because the individual would prefer to reallocate consumption from the future to the
present, but is essentially liquidity constrained by the constant real nature of the annuity
payments, as can be seen in gure 2. Were the individual permitted to annuitize any amount,
he would optimally choose to place 72 percent of his assets in the real annuity and retain
28 percent in bonds. If he pursued this strategy, the consumer would have an EV of 19,
as indicated in column (3). Column (4) shows the EV for a consumer who is permitted
to choose any annuitized payout trajectory that he wishes. We know from Result 1 that
complete annuitization is optimal when any consumption stream that can be purchased by
bonds can be mimicked by annuities. This number must be weakly greater than the EV
associated with complete real annuitization, or equal in the knife-edge case where optimal
consumption is constant with actuarially fair prices. In this case, the consumer would choose
to place all of his wealth in an annuity with a downward sloping payout trajectory and this
would give him an even larger EV of 24.
The nal case in the top panel shows the eect of increasing risk aversion from 1 to 2. As
has been found elsewhere, this increases the value of annuitization. With a discount factor of
1.03 1, the EV of complete annuitization rises to 56. Complete real annuitization is optimal
for this individual.
The three cases in the middle panel consider a standard-of-living eect case, where the
individual has a large amount of wealth relative to his standard-of-living. This large ratio
of wealth to standard-of-living means that the endowment of wealth is enough to sustain
more consumption per year than the consumer is used to. Comparing the results in the
middle panel to the upper panel (i.e., no standard-of-living eect), we see that the value
of annuitization is much greater. This is not surprising since consumption is backloaded
compared with the additively separable cases in the rst panel. For the case of log utility
and a discount rate equal to the interest rate, EV is 64 for a real annuity and 82 for an
20For example, Brown, Mitchell and Poterba (2002) found that the EV for this case was 0.50 when allowing
the maximum lifespan to run to age 115.
26optimally chosen payout trajectory. Even when the individual discounts the future more
highly, annuities are quite valuable, as indicated by the middle case, where the individual
would choose to place 99 percent of their wealth in a real annuity. Consistent with the
case in which there is no standard-of-living eect, we see that the value of annuitization
is increasing with the concavity of the utility function and determined by 
. Figures 4, 5
and 6 graphically show the consumption paths with and without annuitization. The hump
shape arises because of the standard-of-living eect. At retirement, the individual has a
stock of wealth that allows them to consume in excess of their standard-of-living. Therefore,
the individual gradually increases consumption and raises their standard-of-living to a point
that it can be sustained given the wealth endowment. The fourth and sixth gures show
a considerable dierence between optimal consumption with choice over annuity trajectory
and given the constant real annuity; hence we see a considerable benet to 
exibility in
annuity payout in these cases.
In the bottom panel, we explore the case in which the initial standard-of-living is large
relative to resources. In this setting, smoothing the ratio of consumption to the standard-of-
living ct
st requires large initial consumption that is rapidly decreasing over time, as indicated
in gures 7, 8 and 9. Such a consumption path is inconsistent with a constant real annuity
and as a result the standard-of-living eect now reduces the value of the annuity. In the case
where 
=1 and  = 1:03 1, the value of the annuity falls from 44 percent of wealth without
the standard-of-living eect to 36 percent with a standard-of-living eect. With a higher
discount rate, complete, mandatory real annuitization is even less attractive, providing an
EV of only 3. When risk aversion increases to 2, smoothing the ratio ct
st becomes an even
greater priority and complete real annuitization actually reduces utility.
Even in the latter case, which is the worst case for annuitization analyzed here, a large
fraction of wealth is optimally annuitized even if a constant real annuity is the only form
of annuity available. In particular, if the individual is permitted to annuitize 60 percent of
wealth in a real annuity, this is equivalent to a 27 percent increase in wealth. For perspective,
Mitchell and Moore (2000) nd that the median household nearing retirement has pensions
and Social Security making up 60 percent of its retirement wealth. Thus, while many house-
holds have annuities that make up a substantial fraction of wealth, the implication of these
simulations is that preferences alone may have a dicult time explaining the absence of
annuitization for households with substantial asset holdings.
275 Conclusions and Future Directions
With complete markets, the result of complete annuitization survives the relaxation of
several standard, but restrictive assumptions. Utility need not satisfy the von Neumann-
Morgenstern axioms and need not be additively separable. Further, annuities must only oer
positive net premia over conventional assets; they need not be actuarially fair. Even with
incomplete annuities markets, as long as there is a positive premium to annuitizing wealth
and conventional markets are complete, at least some positive fraction of wealth is optimally
annuitized.
Even without bequest motives, we nd that a lack of complete insurance markets can
render even a small amount of annuitization suboptimal. This suggests that an increase in
the use of other forms of insurance might encourage annuitization from a demand perspective.
This is interesting in light of the suggestion by Warshawsky et al. (forthcoming) that linking
annuities and long term care insurance might improve the problem of adverse selection in
both markets.
In the much-studied case of a world where only individual mortality is uncertain, we
nd that there may be considerable individual heterogeneity in the value of annuitization.
However, even for preferences which render a constant real annuity relatively unattractive, a
large fraction of wealth is optimally annuitized even if this is the only form of annuitization
available. It would be interesting to consider for what fraction of the American elderly social
security and pensions amount to more than the lowest optimal fraction of wealth (60 %)
that we nd.
In our simulations, we have retained the abstractions of no bequest motive, no risks other
than longevity and no learning about health status or other liquidity concerns. Exploring
the consequences of dropping these assumptions in the context of non-separable preferences
and unfair annuity pricing would be an important generalization, but obtaining results will
require strong assumptions both on annuity returns and on the nature of bequest preferences
and liquidity needs.
The near absence of voluntary annuitization and the absence of annuitization early in
life are puzzling in the face of theoretical results suggesting large benets to annuitization.
Our analysis extends the puzzle by demonstrating that annuitization of all nancial assets is
optimal more generally than previously thought. In general, incomplete annuity markets may
render annuitization of a large fraction of wealth suboptimal; our simulation results show
that this is not the case for some special cases of preferences and when annuity markets are
incomplete only in that they impose a single payout trajectory across time.
It is sometimes argued that the lack of annuity purchase is evidence for bequests. This
28raises the question of what sort of bequest motive would call for an absence of annuities. If
there is no annuitization, then a bequest is random in both timing and size, measured as a
PDV. Assuming one cares about the risk aversion of recipients, this may be dominated by
giving the heirs a xed sum at a xed time and annuitizing the rest. More generally, partial
annuitization can reduce the variation in the bequest.21 The extent of dominance depends
on load factors; with a bequest motive, the load factor that is sucient to cut o annuity
purchases is lower, because we expect that sharing the outcome with someone else reduces
risk aversion.
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31Table 1: Simulated Utility Gains from Access to Annuitization 
(EV = Equivalent Variation) 
________________________________________________________________________
                 (1)             (2)       (3)            (4) 
          EV for all   Optimal %  EV for        EV for all 
           wealth in a  of wealth  optimal %          wealth in an  
Case          constant           annuitized  of wealth            annuity with 
          real    in real     in a real      optimal 
          annuity  annuity      annuity       payout 
                  trajectory 
________________________________________________________________________
No Standard of Living 
J = 1 
G = 1.03
-1      44    100%    44    44 
G = 1.10
-1      15    72%    19    24 
J = 2 
G = 1.03
-1      56    100%    56    56 
________________________________________________________________________
 Small Standard of Living (ratio of wealth to standard of living = 20) 
J = 1 
G = 1.03
-1      64    100%    64    83 
G = 1.10
-1      36    99%    36    38 
J = 2 
G = 1.03
-1      70    100%    70    91 
________________________________________________________________________
Large Standard of Living (ratio of wealth to standard of living = 2) 
J = 1 
G = 1.03
-1      36    84%    45    48 
G = 1.10
-1      3    63%    20    24 
J = 2 
G = 1.03
-1      -9    60%    35    41 
________________________________________________________________________
Notes:  As explained in text, all simulations are for a 65-year old male with a starting wealth normalized to 
100.  Mortality rates are based on cohort tables the cohort table for men turning 65 in 1999, as determined 
by the Office of the Actuary of the Social Security Administration.  Column 1 reports the equivalent 
variation for placing 100 percent of wealth in a constant real annuity.  Column 2 reports the optimal 
fraction of wealth that would be annuitized in a real annuity if the individual is given the choice to partially 
annuitize.  Column 3 reports the equivalent variation for placing in a real annuity the fraction of wealth 
reported in column 2.  Column 4 reports the equivalent variation for complete annuitization when the 
individual can choose any payout trajectory.  In the case of no standard of living, J represents the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion.  G is the discount factor.   
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